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Abstract
Research shows that over the last decade, malware have been growing
exponentially, causing substantial financial losses to various organizations.
Different anti-malware companies have been proposing solutions to defend
attacks from these malware. The velocity, volume, and the complexity of
malware are posing new challenges to the anti-malware community. Cur-
rent state-of-the-art research shows that recently, researchers and anti-
virus organizations started applying machine learning and deep learning
methods for malware analysis and detection. We have used opcode fre-
quency as a feature vector and applied unsupervised learning in addition
to supervised learning for malware classification. The focus of this tuto-
rial is to present our work on detecting malware with (1) various machine
learning algorithms and (2) deep learning models. Our results show that
the Random Forest outperforms Deep Neural Network with opcode fre-
quency as a feature. Also in feature reduction, Deep Auto-Encoders are
overkill for the dataset, and elementary function like Variance Threshold
perform better than others. In addition to the proposed methodologies,
we will also discuss the additional issues and the unique challenges in the
domain, open research problems, limitations, and future directions.
Keywords: Auto-Encoders, Cyber Security, Deep Learning, Machine Learn-
ing and Malware Detection.
1 Introduction
In the digital age, malware have impacted a large number of computing devices.
The term malware come from malicious software which are designed to meet
the harmful intent of a malicious attacker. Malware can compromise comput-
ers/smart devices, steal confidential information, penetrate networks, and crip-
ple critical infrastructures, etc. These programs include viruses, worms, trojans,
spyware, bots, rootkits, ransomware, etc. According to Computer Economics1,
financial loss due to malware attack has grown quadruple from $3.3 billion in
1997 to $13.3 billion in 2006. Every few years the definition of Year of Mega
1https://www.computereconomics.com/article.cfm?id=1225
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Breach has to be recalibrated based on attacks performed in that particular
year. Recently in 2016, WannaCry ransomware attack2 crippled the computers
of more than 150 countries, doing financial damage to different organizations.
In 2016, Cybersecurity Ventures3 estimated the total damage due to malware
attacks was $3 trillion in 2015 and is expected to reach $6 trillion by 2021.
Antivirus software (such as Norton, McAfee, Avast, Kaspersky, AVG, Bit-
defender, etc.) is a major line of defense for malware attacks. Traditionally,
an antivirus software used the signature-based method for malware detection.
Signature is a short sequence of bytes which can be used to identify known mal-
ware. But the signature-based detection system cannot provide security against
zero-day attacks. Also, malware generation toolkits like Zeus [1] can generate
thousands of variant of the same malware by using different obfuscation tech-
niques. Signature generation is often a human-driven process which is bound to
become infeasible with the current malware growth.
In the past few years, researchers and anti-malware communities have re-
ported using machine learning and deep learning based methods for designing
malware analysis and detection system. We surveyed these systems and divided
the existing literature into two lines of research. (1) feature extraction and
feature reduction: In malware analysis, features can be generated in two dif-
ferent ways: static analysis and dynamic analysis. In static analysis, features
are extracted without executing the code whereas in dynamic analysis features
are derived while running the executable. Ye et al. [17] used Windows API
calls obtained from the static analysis as they can reflect true intent or behavior
of an attacker. Their experiments show that few API calls like OpenProcess,
CloseHandle, CopyFileA etc. always co-occur in malicious executables. Raff
et al. [20] concluded that byte level n-gram could gather a lot of information
about maliciousness from the code section as compared to portable executable
header or import sections in a binary file. Strings also contain crucial semantic
details, and they can often reflect the attackers real intent and goals. Studies
show that in a particular malware family, sample executables often share a sim-
ilar group of opcodes [16]. Also, few opcodes are more dominant in malicious
files as compare to benign executables which can act as a distinguisher. During
malware analysis often features vector become extensively large, and it can have
a negative impact during modeling. Literature shows various feature selection
methods like document frequency [8], information gain [7], max-relevance al-
gorithm [18] have been used in various malware detection systems. Azar [19]
performed feature reduction using auto-encoders (in turn reducing the mem-
ory requirement) and applied various classification algorithms to achieve higher
accuracy. David et al. [2] used a deep stack of de-noising auto-encoders imple-
mented as deep belief network to generate the reduced feature set. (2) Building
Classification Models: After feature extraction each file can be represented
as a feature vector which can be used by the classification algorithm to build a
model for malware detection. Firdausi et al. [3] used naive bayes, J48, decision
2https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-
losses
3https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016
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tree, k-nearest neighbor, multi-level perceptron and support vector machine on
features extracted (using dynamic analysis) and achieved the highest accuracy
of 96.8% with J48. Moskovitch [8] generated feature vectors with the byte n-
gram method and applied feature selection based on document frequency and
gain ratio. They reported highest accuracy by selecting top 300 5-gram terms
with decision tree and artificial neural network. In 2013, Santos et al. [11] gen-
erated a combined feature vector from the static analysis (sequence of opcode
frequency) and dynamic features (system call, exception, etc.) from a sample
of 1000 malicious and 1000 benign files. Hardy et al. [4] in 2016 used Win-
dows API calls as features with stacked autoencoder for malware detection and
achieved an accuracy of 96.85%.
2 Experimental Setup
We formulate the problem of malware analysis and detection as a binary classi-
fication problem where malware and benign are the two classes. Figure 1 shows
the proposed approach is a multi-step process consisting of various phases per-
forming several tasks: collection of the dataset, disassembling of executable files,
feature extraction, dimension reduction, building classification models, and em-
pirical analysis of the results based on different metrics. We discuss each of
these phases in the following subsections.
2.1 Dataset
To conduct our experiments, we gathered malware and benign executables from
different sources. We downloaded malware samples from an open source repos-
itory known as Malicia Project4. In Malicia Project, Nappa et al. [9] have
collected 11, 688 malware samples on Windows platform belonging to a total of
55 different malware families The data collection is performed over a span of
11 months (07/03/2012 to 25/03/2013) from more than 500 drive-by download
servers also known as exploit servers. Typically these servers are deployed for
a lifetime of 16 hours while some servers even operated for months to spread
the malware files. Many malware executables in the dataset will connect to the
internet without user consent to perform some cybercrime operation. Most of
the malicious executable will also repack themselves on an average of 5.4 times
in a day to evade the antivirus signature-based detection system. Thus opcode
frequency as a feature can be an excellent measure to detect these malware.
To collect benign executable samples for our dataset, we gathered default
files installed in different Windows operating system. VirusTotal5 is an anti-
virus aggregator that can be used to check whether an executable is malicious
or benign. We declare a sample as non-malicious/benign when all the anti-
virus from virustotal.com declares it as harmless. We combine the malware and
4http://malicia-project.com/
5https://www.virustotal.com/
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benign executable files downloaded from different sources (Malicia and Win-
dows) and use it as our experimental dataset. Thus the dataset contains 11, 688
malware and 2, 819 benign executable files.
2.2 Disassembling of Malicious and Benign Executables
As discussed in section 2.1 our data set consist of 14, 507 executable files. To
generate the features, we disassemble them by converting an executable file
(.exe) to assembly code (.asm). We used object dump utility which is a part of
GNU Binutils package6. During disassembling few executable files were found
to be corrupted or encrypted thus those files were removed from the dataset.
Finally, we used 2, 819 benign and 11, 308 malware executables to generate the
feature vector and to build the classification model.
2.3 Creation of Feature Vector space
In any machine learning algorithm, the feature vector is a critical component.
We generate our feature vector by the static analysis of executable files. In
static analysis, discriminatory attributes are collected without the execution of
code. Literature shows that various static attribute such as Windows API calls
[17] [15], strings [15], opcode [14] [10], and control flow graph [15], etc. are used
to separate the malicious and benign executables. We used opcode frequency
as a discriminatory feature. Firstly an exhaustive feature list called as master
opcode list of 1, 600 unique opcodes was created. We future generate a feature
vector where rows represent the file name, and columns represent the opcode
frequency. Each entry in the vector space represents the number of occurrence
of a particular opcode in that file. Finally, the vector space of 2819 × 1600 for
benign and 11308× 1600 for malware executables was generated.
2.4 Other issues
Since there is a significant difference between the number of malware (11, 308)
and benign executables (2, 819) in our dataset, thus it will lead to class imbal-
ance problem. Various methods are available to solve class imbalance problem
like random sampling (oversampling/undersampling), cluster-based sampling,
ADASYN [5], etc. We used Adaptive Synthetic sampling approach for imbal-
anced learning (ADASYN) which is an oversampling method for minority class
tuples. It synthetically generates data points of minority class based on the
k-nearest neighbor algorithm.
As discussed in section 2.3, our dataset contains a large number of features
and executable files thus we used cross-validation to generalize our model to an
independent dataset. We used 3-fold cross validation in all our experiments. In
rotation estimation (a.k.a. cross-validation) data is split into three equal parts
where two blocks are used to training the model, and remaining one block is
6https://www.gnu.org/software/binutils/
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Figure 1: Flowchart for the classification of malware with different sets of fea-
tures. (Source: Sewak et al. [12])
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used for testing. The above exercise is done three times to accommodate all
possible combinations.
3 Modelling Malware Detection
As discussed in section 2, malware detection is a binary classification problem.
After disassembling the executable samples (malware/benign), successfully gen-
erating the feature vectors and using ADASYN, the next steps are dimension-
ality reduction and then finally building the classification models.
3.1 Dimensionality Reduction
In statistics and machine learning, dimensionality reduction is a process of re-
ducing the number of features under consideration. Our feature vector suffers
from the curse of dimensionality since the total number of the unique opcode is
1, 600. When we further analyzed our feature set, we found that for few opcodes
the corresponding frequency is zero since the particular opcodes are deprecated.
Also for few opcodes, the count was relatively less because they are platform
specific and the platform is deprecated. A model created on a dataset suffering
from the curse of dimensionality will take a longer time to train and is inefficient
in space complexity as well. To choose an optimal number of features we are
using different variants of dimensionality reduction methods.
1. None: In this method all the opcodes are taken into account for building
a classification model without using any feature reduction. We use this as
a baseline for different feature reduction methods.
2. Variance Threshold: It is a method used to remove the features with low
variations. We have removed the attributes with a variance of less than
0.1 assuming they have less prediction power.
3. Auto-Encoders: In deep learning auto-encoders are unsupervised learning
methods which require only feature vector (opcode frequency), and not
class labels for dimensionality reduction.
(a) A single layer auto-encoder (Non Deep Auto-Encoder), also referred
to as AE-1L which contain one encoder layer and a decoder layer.
(b) A 3-layer stacked auto-encoder(Deep Auto-Encoder), also referred to
as AE-3L which contain three encoders followed by three decoders.
For our experiments, all the auto-encoders use Exponential Linear Unit
(ELU) function at all the layers except in the last layer which uses linear
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Figure 2: Plot for AE-1L shows
mean squared error loss (y-axis) for
training and validation across 120
epochs (x-axis) (Source: Sewak et
al. [13])
Figure 3: Plot for DNN-2L shows
cross entropy loss (y-axis) for train-
ing and validation across 120 epochs
(x-axis) (Source: Sewak et al. [13])
activation function. In AE-1L, the input directly connects to bottleneck
layer which in turn link to the output layer. In both the auto-encoder (AE-
1L and AE-3L) models, the bottleneck layer consists of 32 ELU nodes.
Thus the architecture of AE-1L is (Input-32-Output) where bottleneck
layer will behave as both encoder and decoder. In case of AE-3L where
encoder consists of two additional hidden layers connected in sequential
order containing 128 and 64 nodes respectively. Similarly, AE-3L de-
coder comprised of two hidden layers of similar width but connected in
reverse order. Thus architecture of AE-3L will be (Input-128-64-32-64-
128-Output). For training of both the auto-encoders (AE-1L and AE-3L),
the mean square error is used as a loss function over a batch size of 64
samples. Instead of using standard stochastic gradient we have used Adam
optimizer [6] to train a batch over 120 epochs. The figure (2) shows the
training and validation loss for AE-1L during a complete cycle. The plot
shows mean squared error loss (y-axis) for training and validation which
are converging around 120 epoch (x-axis).
3.2 Building the learning model
In this paper, we used both machine learning and deep learning based ap-
proaches to build the classification models. Based on learning methods we
divided our work into two case studies: (1) model based on the Random Forest
(RF). In the previous studies [14] [10] conducted on the Malicia dataset [9], we
found that tree-based classifier performs better as compared to other classifiers
while among tree based classifier RF outperforms others. Thus we finally choose
RF from the set of standard classifiers. (2) models based on deep learning.
1. Deep Neural Network using two hidden layers (DNN-2L)
2. Deep Neural Network using four hidden layers (DNN-4L)
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3. Deep Neural Network using seven hidden layers (DNN-7L)
We designed multiple models of different depths to learn features at the dif-
ferent level of abstraction. In DNNs all the hidden layers contain ELU activation
function except the last. Since malware detection is a binary classification prob-
lem, the last layer comprises of softmax activation (sigmoid) function. All the
DNNs contain Adam optimizer [6] instead of gradient decent since in general,
they have faster convergence rate. Also, we used cross entropy loss function and
to avoid overfitting problems we used a dropout rate of 0.1. In DNN-2L, the
two hidden layers contain 1024 and 32 nodes respectively. DNN-4L contain four
layers with 212−2i nodes in each layer. Thus DNN-4L hidden layers contains
(1024, 256,64,16) nodes. The DNN-7L has seven layers with 211−i nodes in ith
hidden layer. Thus DNN-7L hidden layer contain (1024, 512, 256, 128, 64, 32,
16) nodes. Figure 3 shows the training and validation loss for DNN-2L for a
complete cycle of 120 epochs. In this figure, both training and validation loss
are gradually decreasing as the model parameters are getting trained in each
epoch and finally converged around 120 epoch. Also, something training loss
is more than validation loss which is counterintuitive but is it because of the
drop-out rate (0.1) during the training cycle.
4 Results
In this section, we will discuss the experimental results obtained after feature
reduction (refer section 2.3) with classification models (refer section 3) using
various evaluation metrics (accuracy, recall, selectivity, and precision).
Table 1 reveals that for different feature reduction methods we found that
VT (combined with RF) based attribute reduction achieved the highest accuracy
of 99.78% which is marginally higher than no reduction (None and RF) 99.74%
in the feature set. AE-1L performed better than deeper Auto-Encoder (AE-3L)
and obtained the highest accuracy (99.41%) with RF. AE-3L based reduction
performed lowest in all the methods. Highest True Positive Rate (TPR) of
99.59% was archived by VT (and RF) followed by None, and highest True
Negative Rate (TNR) of 100% was achieved by no feature reduction (None and
RF).
Table 1 shows that among different classification models, RF outperformed
the deep learning models and achieved the highest accuracy of 99.7% (RF and
VT). RF again produced the second highest accuracy with no feature reduction.
Between different deep learning models, DNN-3L and DNN-7L both combined
with AE-1L attained an accuracy of 98.99%. Highest TPR and TNR were
produced by RF with VT and None as feature reduction respectively.
5 Conclusion
In the last few years malware have become a significant threat. Classical defense
mechanism (like signature-based malware detection) used by anti-virus will fail
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Table 1: Results with Features Reduction, Classification Models, Accuracy,
Recall /True Positive Rate (TPR), Selectivity /True Negative Rate (TNR),
Precision /Positive Predictive Value (PPV) (Source: Sewak et al. [12])
Features Classifiers Accuracy TPR TNR PPV
None RF 99.74 99.48 100.0 100.0
VT RF 99.78 99.59 99.97 99.97
AE-1L RF 99.41 98.86 99.97 99.97
AE-3L RF 99.36 98.72 100.0 100.0
None DNN-2L 97.79 96.33 99.26 99.24
VT DNN-2L 98.84 98.32 99.37 99.37
AE-1L DNN-2L 96.95 94.57 99.37 99.34
AE-3L DNN-2L 96.25 93.75 98.79 98.74
None DNN-4L 97.42 95.38 99.48 99.46
VT DNN-4L 98.69 97.96 99.42 99.42
AE-1L DNN-4L 98.99 98.29 99.70 99.70
AE-3L DNN-4L 97.16 98.61 95.68 95.85
None DNN-7L 96.15 99.05 93.20 93.66
VT DNN-7L 96.20 98.89 93.48 93.89
AE-1L DNN-7L 98.99 98.61 99.81 99.81
AE-3L DNN-7L 93.60 87.97 99.31 99.23
to cope up new age malware challenges. In this paper, we have modeled malware
analysis and detection as machine learning and deep learning problem. We have
used best practices in building these models (like cross-validation, fixing class
imbalance problem, etc.). We expertly handled the curse of dimensionality by
using various feature reduction methods (None, AE-1L and AE-3L). Finally,
we compared the models build using RF and DNN (DNN-2L, DNN-4L, and
DNN-7L).
Based on our results random forest outperforms all the three deep neural
network models in malware detection. We achieved the highest accuracy of
99.78% with random forest and variance threshold which is an improvement of
1.26% on previously reported the best accuracy. Also in feature reduction, vari-
ance threshold outplayed auto-encoders in improving the model performance.
Another significant contribution of our investigation is a comparison of different
combinations of auto-encoder (of depth 1 and 3) and deep neural network (of
depth 2, 4 and 7) for malware detection. To our surprise, the best result did not
come from any of the deep learning models which indicates that deep leaning
may be overkill for Malicia dataset and the trained models are moving towards
overfitting.
The same models can be used to detect more complex malware (polymor-
phic and metamorphic) in the future. Further, it will be interesting to see the
effectiveness of other deep learning techniques like recurrent neural network,
long short-term memory, etc. for malware detection.
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